III. What Can We Know: Descartes and the Meditations on First Philosophy
A. Meditation One and the Modern World View
1. Introduction to René Descartes
Descartes was descended from a family of well to do lawyers and educated at the newly founded Jesuit College of La Flèche. He likely attended La Flèche for 7-8 years from the age of 10 to 17 or 18. At La Flèche he studied Latin and Greek, classical poets and Cicero, mathematics, and three years of philosophy based on the philosophy of Aristotle. At the time Descartes was at La Flèche, natural philosophical systems other than Aristotle’s were beginning to gain currency in Europe. Among the important changes in the intellectual life of the era was the discovery of the moons of Jupiter by Galileo in 1610. This was used to argue for an understanding of the universe, a heliocentric understanding, that was radically different from the geocentric universe argued by Aristotle and the Roman Catholic church. Galileo was declared a heretic by the Catholic church. Descartes feared a similar fate and throughout his life attempted to avoid any religious controversy. This avoidance of religious controversy was particularly important given the schism of the Protestant Reformation.
Descartes eventually received a law degree, but he never practiced law. Instead became a “gentleman soldier” in the wars between France and Spain.
On the night of November 10, 1619, Descartes had three dreams that he interpreted as telling him he should reform all knowledge. He began this by reforming philosophy. Like most of the other thinkers of his time, Descartes believed the principles of the other sciences must be built upon the foundation of philosophy.
During the 1620s Descartes travelled in France and Italy and worked on his Rules for the Direction of the Mind. By 1628 he had completed about half of the Rules, which he then abandoned. It was published posthumously in 1701. He moved to the Netherlands where he worked on meteorology and metaphysics. In the later field he eventually published Discourse on the Method (in French, 1637) and then his Meditations on First Philosophy.
Prior to the publication of his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes sent his document to “the twenty or thirty most learned theologians” (these actually included both theologians — scholars who specialize in the study of God (Theos) and God’s works — and philosophers) soliciting from them objections to his arguments. When his Meditations were published, they were published (1641) with the objections that had been submitted to him and Descartes’ replies to these objections.
After the publication of the Meditations, Descartes devoted himself to studying and writing on physics (Principles of Philosophy, 1644), physiology (where his incomplete writings were published posthumously) and, then, in the Passions of the Soul, on behavioral physiology including the emotions (in French, 1649).
In the broad range of his research and publication record, we can see Descartes as the paradigmatic natural philosopher for whom all areas of philosophy and the natural world were suitable topics for research and publication. This sort of scholarly activity is profoundly different from the highly specialized research that is characteristic of modern scholarship.
In 1649, Descartes accepted an invitation of Queen Christina of Sweden to become her court philosopher. While in Sweden he composed the Statutes of the Swedish Royal Academy. He also became ill, never recovered, and died on 11 February 1650. Descartes’ skull can be viewed at the Musée de l’Homme in Paris
2. Meditations on First Philosophy
The purpose of the Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy is to provide a foundation for knowledge. This foundation for knowledge constructed is based on Descartes’ view that knowledge = certainty = indubitability. “Indubitable” means “beyond the possibility of doubt.” Descartes’ basic view is that we can only truly say that we know when we are certain that what we claim to know is true. You only know whether the sun is out if you are certain of the truth of this claim. Are you certain, for example, that there is such a place as New Zealand? If you are, what gives you this certainty?
In understanding what Descartes means by “certain” it is helpful to distinguish between psychological certainty and epistemic certainty. One is psychologically certain if one is so convinced of the truth of a belief that one will not consider the possibility that it is not true. One is epistemically certain if one does consider all possible reasons to doubt the truth of claim and one concludes that there is no possible reason to doubt the truth of the claim. Thus, for Descartes, a claim is certain if it is indubitable or beyond all possible doubt. If it is certain in such a way, then it is known to be true.
Another example may help. You probably believe you have bones. You probably have never seen your bones. However, you may have seen images of what you believe are your bones and you may, if you have been in a severe accident, even have seen what you believe to be your bones. But are you epistemically certain that you have bones? Have you considered all the possible reasons to doubt you have bones?
In order to answer this question and other questions like it, in “Meditation One” of his Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes applies his method of doubt. The method of doubt uses skeptical doubt to see if there is anything that cannot be doubted. Using this method Descartes would subject your belief to three questions. These questions are the basis for what Descartes calls “systematic doubt.” Systematic doubt is doubt directed at everything that can be doubted.
First, he would ask, are our senses dubitable?
(Of course, our senses often present to the mind sensations that do not reflect the way things really are. Think about optical illusions or mirages.)
Second, is it possible that you are dreaming without knowing it?
(Of course, have you ever thought you had woken only to find yourself still dreaming?)
Finally, is it possible that the world was created by a being who created the world with the purpose of deceiving you about what you believe? (This is the evil demon or demon deceiver hypothesis.)
(Of course, it is possible. One may not have reason to believe it, but it might be true. Think about the film The Matrix or about virtual reality simulations.)
Given that your senses deceive you, you might be dreaming and you might be living in a simulation, your belief that you have bones, while perhaps psychologically certain, is not epistemically certain.
As was written above, Descartes systematically doubts everything it is possible to doubt. He then reflects on all that he doubts ad determines whether, given this method, anything remains that is indubitable. If anything remains that is indubitable, it is certain. If it is certain, then it is known to be true.
This Crash Course video may be helpful with thinking this through:
In “Meditation One” of his Meditations, Descartes presents his method of doubt as the first step in a series of steps whose goal is to find epistemic certainty and metaphysical truth.
Note: Descartes writes in a very careful step-by step fashion. He often repeats and reviews what he has previously said. This is not easy reading and it gets more difficult as the Meditations proceed. Read through each Meditation once from start to finish and understand what you can. Then, reread it again and try to understand the some of the details of the argument. Then come to class and we will discuss the Meditation. Use the Summary and Response paper to put the gist of the argument in your own words.
Also, Descartes’ Meditations are written under the assumption that any careful and rational thinker will come to the same conclusions that Descartes comes to. Try to be such a thinker. Follow Descartes’ steps and see if your reach the same conclusions he does. If you do not, try to determine the reasons why.
About the Translation
The text of Descartes’ Meditations included here is used with permission from https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/, ©2010–2015 Jonathan Bennett.
Bennett does not attempt to provide a literal translation of Descartes’ Meditations. His goal is to provide a translation that is both accurate but also accessible to the general reader. An example of this is the conversation between “Hopeful” and “Doubtful” in “Meditation One.” There is no such conversation in Descartes’ original text. As you read Bennett’s translation pay careful attention to Bennett’s notes and comments. [1])
3. First Meditation: On what can be called into doubt
Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed, and by how doubtful was the structure of beliefs that I had based on them. I realized that if I wanted to establish anything in the sciences that was stable and likely to last, I needed—just once in my life—to demolish everything completely and start again from the foundations. It looked like an enormous task, and I decided to wait until I was old enough to be sure that there was nothing to be gained from putting it off any longer. I have now delayed it for so long that I have no excuse for going on planning to do it rather than getting to work. So today I have set all my worries aside and arranged for myself a clear stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself, sincerely and without holding back, to demolishing my opinions.
Exercises
1. Reread this first paragraph of “Meditation One.” There is a progression of Descartes’ thought process.
The main point he makes in the first sentence is:
1.
The, in the second sentence he says that because of 1, he has to do what?
2.
And, furthermore, in order to do 2, he has to:
3.
I can do this without showing that all my beliefs are false, which is probably more than I could ever manage. My reason tells me that as well as withholding assent from propositions that are obviously •false, I should also withhold it from ones that are •not completely certain and indubitable. So, all I need, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, is to find in each of them at least some reason for doubt. I can do this without going through them one by one, which would take forever: once the foundations of a building have been undermined, the rest collapses of its own accord; so, I will go straight for the basic principles on which all my former beliefs rested.
Exercises
Whatever I have accepted until now as most true has come to me through my senses. But occasionally I have found that they have deceived me, and it is unwise to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.
[The next paragraph presents a series of considerations back and forth. It is set out here as a discussion between two people, but that isn’t how Descartes presented it.]
Hopeful: Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us about objects that are very small or distant, that doesn’t apply to my belief that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on. It seems to be quite impossible to doubt beliefs like these, which come from the senses. Another example: how can I doubt that these hands or this whole body are mine? To doubt such things I would have to liken myself to brain-damaged madmen who are convinced they are kings when really they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that they are pumpkins, or made of glass. Such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad if I modelled myself on them.
Doubtful (sarcastically): What a brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night and often has all the same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake—indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. Often in my dreams I am convinced of just such familiar events— that I am sitting by the fire in my dressing-gown—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed!
Hopeful: Yet right now my eyes are certainly wide open when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it isn’t asleep; when I rub one hand against the other, I do it deliberately and know what I am doing. This wouldn’t all happen with such clarity to someone asleep.
Doubtful: Indeed! As if I didn’t remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I realize that there is never any reliable way of distinguishing being awake from being asleep. This discovery makes me feel dizzy, [joke:] which itself reinforces the notion that I may be asleep!
Suppose then that I am dreaming—it isn’t true that I, with my eyes open, am moving my head and stretching out my hands. Suppose, indeed that I don’t even have hands or any body at all. Still, it has to be admitted that the visions that come in sleep are like paintings: they must have been made as copies of real things; so at least these general kinds of things— eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole—must be real and not imaginary. For even when painters try to depict sirens and satyrs with the most extraordinary bodies, they simply jumble up the limbs of different kinds of real animals, rather than inventing natures that are entirely new. If they do succeed in thinking up something completely fictitious and unreal—not remotely like anything ever seen before—at least the colours used in the picture must be real. Similarly, although these general kinds of things— eyes, head, hands and so on—could be imaginary, there is no denying that certain even simpler and more universal kinds of things are real. These are the elements out of which we make all our mental images of things—the true and also the false ones.
Exercises
These simpler and more universal kinds include body, and extension; the shape of extended things; their quantity, size and number; the places things can be in, the time through which they can last, and so on.
So, it seems reasonable to conclude that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other sciences dealing with things that have complex structures are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other studies of the simplest and most general things—whether they really exist in nature or not—contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a square has only four sides. It seems impossible to suspect that such obvious truths might be false.
However, I have for many years been sure that there is an all-powerful God who made me to be the sort of creature that I am. How do I know that he hasn’t brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, nothing that takes up space, no shape, no size, no place, while making sure that all these things appear to me to exist? Anyway, I sometimes think that others go wrong even when they think they have the most perfect knowledge; so how do I know that I myself don’t go wrong every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square? Well, ·you might say·, God would not let me be deceived like that, because he is said to be supremely good. But, ·I reply·, if God’s goodness would stop him from letting me be deceived •all the time, you would expect it to stop him from allowing me to be deceived even •occasionally; yet clearly I sometimes am deceived.
Some people would deny the existence of such a powerful God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us grant them—for purposes of argument—that there is no God, and theology is fiction. On their view, then, I am a product of fate or chance or a long chain of causes and effects. But the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time—because deception and error seem to be imperfections. Having no answer to these arguments, I am driven back to the position that doubts can properly be raised about any of my former beliefs. I don’t reach this conclusion in a flippant or casual manner, but on the basis of powerful and well thought-out reasons. So in future, if I want to discover any certainty, I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I withhold it from obvious falsehoods.
It isn’t enough merely to have noticed this, though; I must make an effort to remember it. My old familiar opinions keep coming back, and against my will they capture my belief. It is as though they had a right to a place in my belief-system as a result of long occupation and the law of custom. These habitual opinions of mine are indeed highly probable; although they are in a sense doubtful, as I have shown, it is more reasonable to believe than to deny them. But if I go on viewing them in that light I shall never get out of the habit of confidently assenting to them. To conquer that habit, therefore, I had better switch right around and pretend (for a while) that these former opinions of mine are utterly false and imaginary. I shall do this until I have something to counter-balance the weight of old opinion, and the distorting influence of habit no longer prevents me from judging correctly. However far I go in my distrustful attitude, no actual harm will come of it, because my project won’t affect how I •act, but only how I •go about acquiring knowledge.
So I shall suppose that some malicious, powerful, cunning demon has done all he can to deceive me—rather than this being done by God, who is supremely good and the source of truth. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely dreams that the demon has contrived as traps for my judgment. I shall consider myself as having no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as having falsely believed that I had all these things. I shall stubbornly persist in this train of thought; and even if I can’t learn any truth, I shall at least do what I can do, which is to be on my guard against accepting any falsehoods, so that the deceiver—however powerful and cunning he may be—will be unable to affect me in the slightest. This will be hard work, though, and a kind of laziness pulls me back into my old ways. Like a prisoner who dreams that he is free, starts to suspect that it is merely a dream, and wants to go on dreaming rather than waking up, so I am content to slide back into my old opinions; I fear being shaken out of them because I am afraid that my peaceful sleep may be followed by hard labour when I wake, and that I shall have to struggle not in the light but in the imprisoning darkness of the problems I have raised.
Exercises
4. Here Descartes presents the reader with another “suppose,” what is its function in his project to doubt everything that it is possible to doubt? In light of this supposition, is there anything that remains that is beyond the possibility of doubt? If so, what is it?
5. Do you have any questions or additional comments?
- Bennet supplies the following note about his translation: [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. In his title for this work, Descartes is following a tradition (started by Aristotle) which uses ‘first philosophy’ as a label for metaphysics. (Bennett’s note) ↵
